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THE PRESENT INTEREST TEST FOR PURPOSES OF
SPECIAL USE VALUATION
— by Neil E. Harl*
Since publication of the initial regulations,1 the Internal
Revenue Service has maintained that real property was
eligible for special use valuation only if a qualified heir
received a present interest from the decedent.2  Two branches
of the present interest test have emerged.
Discretionary trusts.  One branch of the present
interest test has involved discretionary trusts in which
trustees have a discretionary spray power or a discretionary
right to invade principal to benefit individuals in addition to
those holding the income interest.  The presence of trustee
discretion has the potential to undercut the right of the
holder of the income interest.
The IRS originally took the position that, for the
present interest test to be met, there must be no discretion
in paying income or principal to the qualified heir or heirs.3
Moreover, if an estate representative had discretion in
allocating estate assets, and a beneficiary of one interest did
not have a present interest, the position of IRS was that no
assets (either real or personal) subject to discretionary
allocation by the estate representative were eligible to meet
the threshold requirements of eligibility for special use
valuation.4
The IRS position produced a storm of protest and on
April 27, 1981, IRS announced that discretionary payment
of income or principal would not make land ineligible for
special use valuation if all actual and potential beneficiaries
were members of the decedent's family.5  Later, the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 addressed the problem
retroactive to January 1, 1977, by making interests in a
discretionary trust present interests if all beneficiaries are
qualified heirs.6  Thus, for trusts to meet this branch of the
present interest test — (1) it must be a discretionary trust
and (2) all beneficiaries must be members of the decedent's
family7 which is required for qualified heir status.8
Successive interests.  If successive interests are
created in property by the decedent, the IRS position has
been that all of the interests must vest in qualified heirs and
all of the interests must be specially valued if any part is
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valued under special use valuation.10  If interests pass to
non family members, special use valuation is precluded.11
Likewise, leaving a remainder interest to a charitable
organization precludes special use valuation for life interests
left to eligible family members.12  And if a life estate is
bequeathed to a qualified heir with a special power to
appoint the remainder to other than qualified heirs, special
use valuation is precluded.13  If the qualified heir disclaims
the special power with the result that the remainder interest
vests in a qualified heir, the land is eligible for special use
valuation.14
A major concern has been whether a contingent devise
of land to a charitable organization or to non family
members (for example on failure of a spouse or issue to
survive) subject to a low probability of vesting ownership
in the charitable organization or non family member would
bar a special use value election.  For several years, the IRS
position was that such a contingent devise would preclude a
special use value election.15  The result has been the same,
and special use valuation is denied if a qualified heir
purchased the interest of a non eligible devisee before the
property actually passed to the non eligible taker.16  Thus,
it was generally recommended that all interests vest at the
death of a property owner in family members or vest in the
last surviving member of the decedent's family if special
use valuation was desired.
A series of cases beginning in 1986 have rejected the
IRS position on the successive interest branch of the
present interest test insofar as the IRS position barred a
special use value election where an extremely low
probability existed that property interests could pass to non
family members.  Three Tax Court cases17 held the
regulation invalid and permitted special use valuation
elections where the probabilities were low that ineligible
parties might acquire an interest in real property for which a
special use value election was sought.  The Fourth18 and
the Seventh19 Circuits have indicated basic agreement with
that position.  The Internal Revenue Service now agrees,
also.20
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION.  The plaintiff
claimed an easement by prescription over the defendant's
road used by the plaintiff to haul timber.  The court held
that the only evidence plaintiff provided of adverse use of
the road, actions to widen the road, were insufficient to
overcome the presumption that the use was permissive.
The court cited testimony of the plaintiffs that permission
from the defendants was sought in past years to work on the
road and that the plaintiffs never claimed any right to the
road before the instant suit.  Hollis v. Tomlinson,
585 S.2d 862 (Ala. 1991).
ANIMALS
ESTRAYS .  The defendant was convicted under Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 24-246(A) for shooting a stray horse owned by
a neighbor.  The defendant argued that Ariz. Rev. Stat. §
24-246(D) provided an absolute defense in that the horse
was an estray.  The court held that the exception provided
by Section 246(A) applied only to the "taking up" of
